The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 edited by Paul M. Kennedy

While rummaging through the Pentagon Library a few weeks ago, I ran across this book. I'm very glad I did! Kennedy presents a collection of eleven essays, all previously published in a variety of U.S., UK, Australian, Canadian and German journals from 1961 to 1974. The articles are arranged primarily by country (one exception being an article comparing U.S. and German war plans and how they might've interacted in a bilateral war prior to 1914). All of them were interesting and provided a very interesting look into the military mindset leading up to the war. Unlike the Hamilton and Hertwig work, many of these see militarism, war planning, social Darwinism, fatalism/determinism, and an "all or nothing" mentality as direct causes of the war. Kennedy states that these war plans reflect both military and political attitudes/assumptions that were major factors leading to war.

The section on U.S. war plans focuses fairly broadly, not just on War Plan Black (against Germany), but also looks extensively at U.S. Pacific obligations in light of the outcome of the Spanish-American War. Suddenly in possession of vast territories in the Pacific, the U.S. had to give thought to how to defend their new holdings, especially in light of Japanese expansion already underway. American war plans were very forward-leaning, always looking to the next war, but also remained primarily defensive. American plans did not look to take more territory, only to hold what was already taken. I also found it interesting that American plans never really considered the possibility of having allies. And, at their core, they were very much informed by Mahan and his writing (hardly surprising).

The comparison of German and U.S. war plans was perhaps the most interesting part of the book (to me, anyway). The U.S. expected any German attack to destroy the Monroe Doctrine to occur in Central or South America, the only decent bits of the world not carved into colonies. However, the German plan was for something more interesting - direct attacks against the United States. Their plans shifted over the years, with targets for invasion including the Hampton Roads area, Boston, Washington, New York City, and other key locations. To German thinking in the early 20th Century, the U.S. Army was very small, and most of that was out West dealing with Indians. The U.S. Navy was also weak and easily brushed aside. Thus, conquest of key American cities would lead to a quick capitulation - the intent was not to hold the U.S. indefinitely, but to force capitulation and the end of the Monroe Doctrine (the fact that it was really the UK that maintained it for so long is not addressed). However, there was one tidbit that I found particularly fascinating. Both German and US war plans had one thing in common -- each was to muster its battle fleet at the same location, the small island of Culebra off the east coast of Puerto Rico. That would've been quite a spectacle! Of course, the Germans would've outnumbered the U.S. throughout this entire period, but shorter supply lines might've helped the U.S. German plans to invade the U.S. died when the Schlieffen Plan came into being.

There are multiple essays on British strategy, including an interesting one on the building of the British underwater telegraph system - very fascinating reading and not something much covered elsewhere. On land, the British were reluctant to conduct any planning at first because it was felt that might itself lead to war. Additionally, the focus until 1904-6 or so was on Russia invading India. Uppity German naval building shifted that focus to Europe. Jacky Fisher's reign also saw opposition to naval planning - he believed the war plan should reside solely in the mind of the CinC until war came, and that's what he did, despite opposition from luminaries such as Corbett.

Several chapters on German planning were fairly straightforward - their discussion of an invasion of England made an interesting counterpoint to Riddle of the Sands - instead of using sand bars, the Germans would use commercial shipping in their key ports to sneak an Army across the North Sea, something feasible until the Royal Navy increased their presence there a few years later. In the east, there is a good discussion on German-Austrian coordination of their plans, or perhaps lack of coordination. Both sides promised to attack Russia - neither side wanted to initially, preferring to focus on France and Serbia, respectively. As for the third member of the Triple Alliance, the quote that summed them up was perfect - "Italy was reliable only in its unreliability."

The section on Russia focuses on the 1912 crisis, the author contending that the November crisis in that year over the Balkans was as close to war as 1914, though in this case the Tsar's ministers managed to talk him down from mobilization. The author contends this crisis is often overlooked.

So, this book really allowed me to get my war planning and strategy geek on. I definitely need to develop a scenario for the Avalon Hill game Jutland that covers the Battle of Culebra with miniatures, or at least get in a game of War Plan Black.

While I think that the Hamilton and Herwig book makes a better case of war causes (and thus contradicting the Kennedy book), this was still a very insightful look into pre-war planning and the mindsets of the political and military leadership of the major players.