Decisions for War, 1914-1917 by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig

Holger and Herwig's Decisions for War is a shorter version of another work, The Origins of World War One (which I have not read). Their hypothesis, put simply, is that the origin of the war can be found in the decision-making of small coteries of people in each of the five Great Powers. These small groups of leaders and chief advisors made the decision to enter the war based on strategic calculations, mainly for defensive or "preventive" reasons that, while unique to each country's situation, are really fairly straightforward. The core of the book is a country-by-country analysis of the five great powers, the lesser powers of the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and the United States, examining who in each chose war, and why.

As part of their argument, the authors attack a number of other posited causes for the war, knocking them down one by one. The alliance system, nationalism, militarism, imperialism, social Darwinism, the supposed influence of bankers and big business, and the unavoidable "slide into war" are all discussed and found wanting. For example, a survey of the alliances in place in 1914 shows that they were generally defensive in nature - one state was not required to support its ally unless that ally were attacked. And yet, Germany came to the aid of Austria, while Russia mobilized because of Serbia, which was not even a formal ally. The "social" causes - nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism - are discounted as the authors show that there was no real mechanism for popular opinion to influence leadership in any meaningful way, especially in the monarchical-authoritarian countries. With respect to bankers and industrialists, not only is their influence shown to have been minimal, in most cases they were strongly against war, recognizing the world as a globalized, integrated economy. I was favorably impressed by the arguments the authors use in countering these fairly common perceptions of what led to the war.

With all of the countries, there was this sense of "time running out" and the authors see all five great powers as essentially going to war out of fear, rather than for conquest (Thucydides would recognize these arguments). Germany, despite its meteoric economic rise, was concerned with the perceived expansion and growth of Russia. That country better understood its own weaknesses and knew they were one revolution away from disaster. Austria knew it was dying and felt it had to act against upstarts like Serbia before Balkan pressures destroyed the Hapsburgs. France felt her safety was inextricably entwined with the Franco-Russian alliance. If Russia was going to war, France must do the same to preserve the alliance and thus ensure French security. Finally, Britain's splendid isolation was predicated on ensuring no single power dominated Europe; thus, Britain had to commit to protect France. Thus, basic strategic calculations led to war, not the more commonly perceived reasons the authors argue against.

Of note, the lesser countries discussed - Italy, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece - all joined for territorial aggrandizement. In essence, these lesser powers were opportunists who fought for their own benefit, some, like Italy, against their nominal alliance partners, thus further undermining the argument for the binding nature of treaties. The U.S. was a bit of an outlier, of course, being pulled into war through a series of German provocations, notably unrestricted submarine warfare and the infamous Zimmerman Telegram. However, even all of these participants entered the war after a careful deliberation by a core group of leaders who acted based on a careful analysis of their perceived interests.

So, overall a very interesting book with a well defined and argued hypothesis. I may go back to read the longer version at a later time to see the arguments more fully developed and supported with data, but next up is a look at The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1890-1914 edited by Paul M. Kennedy.

Oh, something I should've done before but will start now - interesting and sometimes previously unknown (by my) anecdotes from the books I read. From Hamilton and Herwig:

• The strongest check on the hawks in Austria was Franz Ferdinand; his death actually made war with Serbia more likely
• Japan operated warships in the Mediterranean in 1917 as convoy escorts
• The French broke German diplomatic codes in 1911. However, the Foreign Minister used them as a political weapon against Prime Minister Caillaux, who then summoned the German Ambassador to Paris and asked him to produce the originals so he could compare them to those stolen by the French! (The term "sources and methods" was obviously lost on the French in 1911!)