A Little Side-reading - Strachan on Strategy

I was stuck in the Pentagon for an hour with nothing to do, so I wandered into the library to read the paper and ran across this article by Hew Strachan in The American Interest on the impact of WW1 on strategy.  It's a bit complex, probably, but interesting, especially given the amount of time I've been thinking "strategic thoughts" for work, of late.

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/06/02/the-strategic-consequences-of-the-world-war/

The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War by David G. Hermann

I finally got my reading going again after a visit to the Pentagon Library to plunder some new material. Herrmann's book proved to be an excellent one to start with and I was sure to do a good deal of reading on 28 June, the 100th anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Herrmann's work is a comparative examination of the armies of the Great Powers in the decade prior to World War I, told chronologically around the series of escalating crises during that time and how those events shaped the armies that would go on to fight the war. He acknowledges that the naval arms race has been written about extensively, but feels that less has been said about the later land forces arms race just prior to the war. He summarizes this decade prior to war as the story of Russia's prostration, recovery, and the effects of this on the perception of relative power. Indeed, the perception of power is key to his analysis. He does not view this perception of power so much as a cause of the war, however, but argues that it is crucial for understanding the timing of the war. All of this is told through the historical lens of the two Moroccan crises, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Annexation crisis, and the Balkan Wars.

Given that we're in the 100th anniversary month for the run up to the war, I'm really focusing on causes with my write-up. Herrmann more or less accepts many of the causes for war already out there - social Darwinism, imperialism, militarism, interlocking alliances, the focus on the offense over defense, and so on. His focus remains firmly on the timing. He argues that all of these factors existed throughout the decade of 1904-1914, and that there were many crises during this time that could've led to a world war, many of them far more serious than an assassination. Some crises, like the naval arms race between Germany and Britain were actually winding down. So why did those other crises not lead to war but 1914's events did? In a nutshell, he points to the perception of relative strength between the two coalitions, largely centered on the restoration of Russian power.

Russia's disastrous defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War left the Czar in a precarious position. His military had been smashed on land and sea to a "mere" Asiatic power. The defeat had led to revolution in his capital. Russia was a beaten, tired power; it would take years to recover from the disaster, but recover they did. As this decade started and progressed, Germany and Austria-Hungary felt that they had a preponderance of power in Europe, and were willing to use this power to threaten their rivals, replacing more traditional diplomacy with a more blustery foreign policy. Despite the mounting crises, they managed to avoid a general war as the perception of their strength prevented it.  However, after the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911-12 (AKA Agadir), Germany suddenly realized that the Russian military restoration, coupled with a strengthening Entente between Britain and France, seemed to indicate a change in the correlation of forces (to use a Soviet term). The perception had shifted on both sides. For the Central Powers, their window of military dominance was ending and would eventually close - despite Germany’s continued increase in power, the outlook for its Austro-Hungarian ally was far less sanguine. Russia had been humiliated during the period of its weakness. As the self-proclaimed guardian of the southern Slavs, Russia had been unable to intervene during the various Balkan crises on behalf of the Serbs. In 1914, it felt it was capable of doing so. Again, the perception of relative power drove the timing of the war. Also, Herrmann points out that in 1914, all the powers viewed a diplomatic defeat as worse than war, given the rough balance of power at that time.

The second Moroccan crisis was the real trigger point. Prior to this point, military expansion and improvement were conducted at a steady pace by all of the Great Powers; after it, Germany triggered an arms race between all the continental powers; each Power now began to expand its army dramatically through a variety of means. War was increasingly being seen as either inevitable, in which case military expansion was important, or as inevitable in the absence of any sort of balance of military power. Either way, an arms race was the result. Of interest, all the major armaments programs in the continental powers were targeted to be completed in 1916 or even later; they were all still in progress in 1914.

Without delving through the author's data, it was fascinating to read his analysis of the various armies during this decade. He uses a great deal of primary sources to paint his picture, the best being the reports of various foreign observers at the different annual army exercises each country held. Herrmann also digs into the technology, looking at the integration of machine guns, aircraft, and especially modern artillery into each major army. This part of the book, interspersed through the discussion of the series of crises, was most interesting.

So, overall an excellent book, one that complements nicely the many other studies of causes for the war. This is another one I'm glad to have read!

On the weird trivia and fun facts, Herrmann mentions in passing experiments with painting horses for camouflage (I'd love to see that dazzle pattern!), the fact that the only significant military secret kept before the war was Germany’s development of the huge 420mm mortar that could fire a plunging shot 13 kilometers, and that early on machine guns were viewed primarily as a replacement for artillery for units that could not bring organic artillery with them for some reason (i.e. mountain troops, cavalry, etc.).