The Great War at Sea - Photos

A very good collection:

http://www.nationalreview.com/slideshows/385118

The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World by Holger Herwig

Herwig's The Marne, 1914 is an account of the earliest battles on the Western Front. It overlaps quite a bit with other accounts (The Guns of August and Catastrophe 1914, for example), but provides a slightly different perspective, as Herwig tries to incorporate more of a German perspective on this period (the book is dedicated to his grandfather who fought and died in the Imperial German Army). Herwig is a superb writer and this was one of the better books I've read thus far for this project. He repeatedly emphasizes the invaluable collection of documents freed up by the end of the Cold War, records thought destroyed by the Allies in 1945 but actually secretly captured by the Soviets. He covers his timeframe chronologically.

Herwig argues that the Marne was the most important battle since Waterloo, and he makes a solid case to support this broad assertion. Briefly, he argues that, though the Marne did not result in either a French or German victory, the fact that it was a stalemate ensured that the war would be a long one, the result being the fall of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires, the rise of fascism and communism, etc.

Herwig does a good job of portraying the German side, especially the disconnects and poor coordination between Kluck's First Army and Bulows' Second Army and the critical move through Belgium and into France. He also hammers home Moltke's poor command and control efforts and lack of coordination between the various moving parts of the Schlieffen plan. He seems to imply that, with better coordination, the German attack might just have succeeded, though he stops short of being explicit on this point. Given the logistical difficulties for Germany, and French interior lines (formation of the 6th Army north of Paris, as an example of how this really helped France), that would be a hard case to argue.

Personally, what I liked most about this book was that it covered the early battles of the war in much greater detail than I've read to date, especially the battle of the Frontiers to the south, an area usually glossed over in other accounts. While not decisive, maybe, these battles consumed huge numbers of soldiers and equipment and were a major contributor to the tremendous attrition of the first weeks of the war.

Some quibbles with the book, though. First, he uses Army historical maps that are somewhat unclear and not always the best depictions of what he is describing. No doubt this saved a good deal of money, but better maps would've helped. Second, he has a tendency to list lots of units and names in rapid succession, making for dense and confusing reading at times. While possibly useful for some, too much detail is just as bad as too little.

All in all, an excellent book and much recommended.

Origins of the First World War by William Mulligan

Time for some catch-up, so this will be short!

Mulligan's Origins of the First World War is a view of the war's origins through the lens of an international relations theorist. That, of course, means it’s a bit drier than most accounts. Still, it makes for an interesting perspective somewhat different in approach from most of the historical accounts I've been reading this year. His primary approach to his analysis is through the lens of globalism and the long term waning of great power conflict. More crucially, he is less interested in the traditional explanations of the war's causes, and is much more concerned with why the war occurred as a result of the July Crisis, and did not occur sooner. In other words, what was different about 1914 than every other crisis in the first decade and a half of the Twentieth Century. He concludes that the July Crisis was not simply a trigger, but a cause in its own right.

For his analysis, Mulligan looks back through post-Napoleonic European history, examining why there was such a long period of peace between Great Powers. This examination is a key part of his book, as he posits that Great Power conflict waned dramatically after Waterloo (he does not mention him, but he definitely seems to be in the Stephen Pinker school of thought). He looks at two balances of power - one within Europe proper, and one with a world-wide perspective; he discusses at length how the two affected one another. He argues that, prior to the Second Morocco Crisis, conflicts did not involve vital interest; those after, did. Further, the alliance system that evolved made wars less likely, not more so, a difference between him and other authors.

As a side, he has a long discussion of the effects of public opinion. He sees it as complex and changing over the time examined, but does not see it as a factor in the war starting. As part of this, he discusses "defensive patriotism" at length, by which he means public opinion in most countries generally did not wish war, but were willing to fight under some circumstances. Public opinion was really more of a tool of politics than an influencer, but it did set some broad limits on what was possible.

A bit dry, but interesting to see a different approach.

A Little Side-reading - Strachan on Strategy

I was stuck in the Pentagon for an hour with nothing to do, so I wandered into the library to read the paper and ran across this article by Hew Strachan in The American Interest on the impact of WW1 on strategy.  It's a bit complex, probably, but interesting, especially given the amount of time I've been thinking "strategic thoughts" for work, of late.

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/06/02/the-strategic-consequences-of-the-world-war/

The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War by David G. Hermann

I finally got my reading going again after a visit to the Pentagon Library to plunder some new material. Herrmann's book proved to be an excellent one to start with and I was sure to do a good deal of reading on 28 June, the 100th anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Herrmann's work is a comparative examination of the armies of the Great Powers in the decade prior to World War I, told chronologically around the series of escalating crises during that time and how those events shaped the armies that would go on to fight the war. He acknowledges that the naval arms race has been written about extensively, but feels that less has been said about the later land forces arms race just prior to the war. He summarizes this decade prior to war as the story of Russia's prostration, recovery, and the effects of this on the perception of relative power. Indeed, the perception of power is key to his analysis. He does not view this perception of power so much as a cause of the war, however, but argues that it is crucial for understanding the timing of the war. All of this is told through the historical lens of the two Moroccan crises, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Annexation crisis, and the Balkan Wars.

Given that we're in the 100th anniversary month for the run up to the war, I'm really focusing on causes with my write-up. Herrmann more or less accepts many of the causes for war already out there - social Darwinism, imperialism, militarism, interlocking alliances, the focus on the offense over defense, and so on. His focus remains firmly on the timing. He argues that all of these factors existed throughout the decade of 1904-1914, and that there were many crises during this time that could've led to a world war, many of them far more serious than an assassination. Some crises, like the naval arms race between Germany and Britain were actually winding down. So why did those other crises not lead to war but 1914's events did? In a nutshell, he points to the perception of relative strength between the two coalitions, largely centered on the restoration of Russian power.

Russia's disastrous defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War left the Czar in a precarious position. His military had been smashed on land and sea to a "mere" Asiatic power. The defeat had led to revolution in his capital. Russia was a beaten, tired power; it would take years to recover from the disaster, but recover they did. As this decade started and progressed, Germany and Austria-Hungary felt that they had a preponderance of power in Europe, and were willing to use this power to threaten their rivals, replacing more traditional diplomacy with a more blustery foreign policy. Despite the mounting crises, they managed to avoid a general war as the perception of their strength prevented it.  However, after the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911-12 (AKA Agadir), Germany suddenly realized that the Russian military restoration, coupled with a strengthening Entente between Britain and France, seemed to indicate a change in the correlation of forces (to use a Soviet term). The perception had shifted on both sides. For the Central Powers, their window of military dominance was ending and would eventually close - despite Germany’s continued increase in power, the outlook for its Austro-Hungarian ally was far less sanguine. Russia had been humiliated during the period of its weakness. As the self-proclaimed guardian of the southern Slavs, Russia had been unable to intervene during the various Balkan crises on behalf of the Serbs. In 1914, it felt it was capable of doing so. Again, the perception of relative power drove the timing of the war. Also, Herrmann points out that in 1914, all the powers viewed a diplomatic defeat as worse than war, given the rough balance of power at that time.

The second Moroccan crisis was the real trigger point. Prior to this point, military expansion and improvement were conducted at a steady pace by all of the Great Powers; after it, Germany triggered an arms race between all the continental powers; each Power now began to expand its army dramatically through a variety of means. War was increasingly being seen as either inevitable, in which case military expansion was important, or as inevitable in the absence of any sort of balance of military power. Either way, an arms race was the result. Of interest, all the major armaments programs in the continental powers were targeted to be completed in 1916 or even later; they were all still in progress in 1914.

Without delving through the author's data, it was fascinating to read his analysis of the various armies during this decade. He uses a great deal of primary sources to paint his picture, the best being the reports of various foreign observers at the different annual army exercises each country held. Herrmann also digs into the technology, looking at the integration of machine guns, aircraft, and especially modern artillery into each major army. This part of the book, interspersed through the discussion of the series of crises, was most interesting.

So, overall an excellent book, one that complements nicely the many other studies of causes for the war. This is another one I'm glad to have read!

On the weird trivia and fun facts, Herrmann mentions in passing experiments with painting horses for camouflage (I'd love to see that dazzle pattern!), the fact that the only significant military secret kept before the war was Germany’s development of the huge 420mm mortar that could fire a plunging shot 13 kilometers, and that early on machine guns were viewed primarily as a replacement for artillery for units that could not bring organic artillery with them for some reason (i.e. mountain troops, cavalry, etc.).

Arlington at 150: WW1 Tour

Not a reading thing, but I took a WW1-centric tour of Arlington as part of the cemetery's 150th anniversary.  Here are a few pics:

Meuse-Argonne Cross

General Tasker Bliss, Chief of Staff of the Army during the war

GEN Pershing, Commander AEF

CPL Frank Buckles, last surviving WW1 Vet (looking towards GEN Pershing)

SGT Edward Younger - he selected the unknown soldier for WW1

LTG James Harbord, USA, Commanded the Marines at Belleau Wood



LTC Charles Pierce - in charge of repatriating remains of U.S. forces back to the U.S.

The Origins of the First World War by Ruth Henig

This was a short book, so this will be a short entry (it is one I found in the bowels of the Pentagon Library). Henig's is a brief summary of scholarly positions on the origins of the war framing a brief survey of events from the rise of Bismarck through 1914. It is intended as a preparation for "advanced exams" though I'm not sure exactly what that means (sounds Harry Potterish to me).

Her focus initially is on the longer term factors already discussed: industrialization, urbanization, German economic growth, social Darwinism, and the like. In Germany, she focuses heavily on the clash between liberalism/socialism/democracy and the Junker aristocracy. Indeed, she spends most of her time looking at Germany, concluding that Bismarck's diplomatic efforts achieved shorter-term stability but at the cost of longer term problems.

She does a decent job of covering the essential events of 1912-1914 in a short amount of space, concluding that the war was not that which the powers had prepared themselves for, mentally or materially. As for war guilt, she does a good job of providing a scholarly survey (a sort of literature review) of the main schools of thought, from 1919 to the present. She definitely agrees with Fritz Fischer, the "father" of German war guilt as the explanation for the war, providing a summary of how he went from academic pariah to widely accepted.

It's a quick little book, and not much new ground, but I rather liked the academic approach to covering the main scholars on the topic.

Next up will probably be a brief WW1 hiatus as I prep for some new grad school classes I am teaching this summer.

The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 edited by Paul M. Kennedy

While rummaging through the Pentagon Library a few weeks ago, I ran across this book. I'm very glad I did! Kennedy presents a collection of eleven essays, all previously published in a variety of U.S., UK, Australian, Canadian and German journals from 1961 to 1974. The articles are arranged primarily by country (one exception being an article comparing U.S. and German war plans and how they might've interacted in a bilateral war prior to 1914). All of them were interesting and provided a very interesting look into the military mindset leading up to the war. Unlike the Hamilton and Hertwig work, many of these see militarism, war planning, social Darwinism, fatalism/determinism, and an "all or nothing" mentality as direct causes of the war. Kennedy states that these war plans reflect both military and political attitudes/assumptions that were major factors leading to war.

The section on U.S. war plans focuses fairly broadly, not just on War Plan Black (against Germany), but also looks extensively at U.S. Pacific obligations in light of the outcome of the Spanish-American War. Suddenly in possession of vast territories in the Pacific, the U.S. had to give thought to how to defend their new holdings, especially in light of Japanese expansion already underway. American war plans were very forward-leaning, always looking to the next war, but also remained primarily defensive. American plans did not look to take more territory, only to hold what was already taken. I also found it interesting that American plans never really considered the possibility of having allies. And, at their core, they were very much informed by Mahan and his writing (hardly surprising).

The comparison of German and U.S. war plans was perhaps the most interesting part of the book (to me, anyway). The U.S. expected any German attack to destroy the Monroe Doctrine to occur in Central or South America, the only decent bits of the world not carved into colonies. However, the German plan was for something more interesting - direct attacks against the United States. Their plans shifted over the years, with targets for invasion including the Hampton Roads area, Boston, Washington, New York City, and other key locations. To German thinking in the early 20th Century, the U.S. Army was very small, and most of that was out West dealing with Indians. The U.S. Navy was also weak and easily brushed aside. Thus, conquest of key American cities would lead to a quick capitulation - the intent was not to hold the U.S. indefinitely, but to force capitulation and the end of the Monroe Doctrine (the fact that it was really the UK that maintained it for so long is not addressed). However, there was one tidbit that I found particularly fascinating. Both German and US war plans had one thing in common -- each was to muster its battle fleet at the same location, the small island of Culebra off the east coast of Puerto Rico. That would've been quite a spectacle! Of course, the Germans would've outnumbered the U.S. throughout this entire period, but shorter supply lines might've helped the U.S. German plans to invade the U.S. died when the Schlieffen Plan came into being.

There are multiple essays on British strategy, including an interesting one on the building of the British underwater telegraph system - very fascinating reading and not something much covered elsewhere. On land, the British were reluctant to conduct any planning at first because it was felt that might itself lead to war. Additionally, the focus until 1904-6 or so was on Russia invading India. Uppity German naval building shifted that focus to Europe. Jacky Fisher's reign also saw opposition to naval planning - he believed the war plan should reside solely in the mind of the CinC until war came, and that's what he did, despite opposition from luminaries such as Corbett.

Several chapters on German planning were fairly straightforward - their discussion of an invasion of England made an interesting counterpoint to Riddle of the Sands - instead of using sand bars, the Germans would use commercial shipping in their key ports to sneak an Army across the North Sea, something feasible until the Royal Navy increased their presence there a few years later. In the east, there is a good discussion on German-Austrian coordination of their plans, or perhaps lack of coordination. Both sides promised to attack Russia - neither side wanted to initially, preferring to focus on France and Serbia, respectively. As for the third member of the Triple Alliance, the quote that summed them up was perfect - "Italy was reliable only in its unreliability."

The section on Russia focuses on the 1912 crisis, the author contending that the November crisis in that year over the Balkans was as close to war as 1914, though in this case the Tsar's ministers managed to talk him down from mobilization. The author contends this crisis is often overlooked.

So, this book really allowed me to get my war planning and strategy geek on. I definitely need to develop a scenario for the Avalon Hill game Jutland that covers the Battle of Culebra with miniatures, or at least get in a game of War Plan Black.

While I think that the Hamilton and Herwig book makes a better case of war causes (and thus contradicting the Kennedy book), this was still a very insightful look into pre-war planning and the mindsets of the political and military leadership of the major players.

Decisions for War, 1914-1917 by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig

Holger and Herwig's Decisions for War is a shorter version of another work, The Origins of World War One (which I have not read). Their hypothesis, put simply, is that the origin of the war can be found in the decision-making of small coteries of people in each of the five Great Powers. These small groups of leaders and chief advisors made the decision to enter the war based on strategic calculations, mainly for defensive or "preventive" reasons that, while unique to each country's situation, are really fairly straightforward. The core of the book is a country-by-country analysis of the five great powers, the lesser powers of the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and the United States, examining who in each chose war, and why.

As part of their argument, the authors attack a number of other posited causes for the war, knocking them down one by one. The alliance system, nationalism, militarism, imperialism, social Darwinism, the supposed influence of bankers and big business, and the unavoidable "slide into war" are all discussed and found wanting. For example, a survey of the alliances in place in 1914 shows that they were generally defensive in nature - one state was not required to support its ally unless that ally were attacked. And yet, Germany came to the aid of Austria, while Russia mobilized because of Serbia, which was not even a formal ally. The "social" causes - nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism - are discounted as the authors show that there was no real mechanism for popular opinion to influence leadership in any meaningful way, especially in the monarchical-authoritarian countries. With respect to bankers and industrialists, not only is their influence shown to have been minimal, in most cases they were strongly against war, recognizing the world as a globalized, integrated economy. I was favorably impressed by the arguments the authors use in countering these fairly common perceptions of what led to the war.

With all of the countries, there was this sense of "time running out" and the authors see all five great powers as essentially going to war out of fear, rather than for conquest (Thucydides would recognize these arguments). Germany, despite its meteoric economic rise, was concerned with the perceived expansion and growth of Russia. That country better understood its own weaknesses and knew they were one revolution away from disaster. Austria knew it was dying and felt it had to act against upstarts like Serbia before Balkan pressures destroyed the Hapsburgs. France felt her safety was inextricably entwined with the Franco-Russian alliance. If Russia was going to war, France must do the same to preserve the alliance and thus ensure French security. Finally, Britain's splendid isolation was predicated on ensuring no single power dominated Europe; thus, Britain had to commit to protect France. Thus, basic strategic calculations led to war, not the more commonly perceived reasons the authors argue against.

Of note, the lesser countries discussed - Italy, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece - all joined for territorial aggrandizement. In essence, these lesser powers were opportunists who fought for their own benefit, some, like Italy, against their nominal alliance partners, thus further undermining the argument for the binding nature of treaties. The U.S. was a bit of an outlier, of course, being pulled into war through a series of German provocations, notably unrestricted submarine warfare and the infamous Zimmerman Telegram. However, even all of these participants entered the war after a careful deliberation by a core group of leaders who acted based on a careful analysis of their perceived interests.

So, overall a very interesting book with a well defined and argued hypothesis. I may go back to read the longer version at a later time to see the arguments more fully developed and supported with data, but next up is a look at The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1890-1914 edited by Paul M. Kennedy.

Oh, something I should've done before but will start now - interesting and sometimes previously unknown (by my) anecdotes from the books I read. From Hamilton and Herwig:

• The strongest check on the hawks in Austria was Franz Ferdinand; his death actually made war with Serbia more likely
• Japan operated warships in the Mediterranean in 1917 as convoy escorts
• The French broke German diplomatic codes in 1911. However, the Foreign Minister used them as a political weapon against Prime Minister Caillaux, who then summoned the German Ambassador to Paris and asked him to produce the originals so he could compare them to those stolen by the French! (The term "sources and methods" was obviously lost on the French in 1911!)

The First World War: An Illustrated History by A J P Taylor

A quick entry for a quick book.  I decided to read another single-volume overview to shake up my "road to war" readings.

Taylor's book is the first I ever read on WW1, quite a few years ago.  It's a fairly short book, with as much space given to illustrations (a lot of great ones) as to text; it is quick and easy to read.  Taylor provides a general, chronological overview of the war focused on the Western Front, though he does discuss other theaters in brief.  Also, he devotes more text to politics than simply recounting battle after battle.  Given the brevity, he does come off as somewhat breathless, but given the scope covered by a small volume, this is to be expected.  Throughout, he maintains a dry, very English, wit to some of his comments (biting and acerbic at times, perhaps).

Taylor certainly provides a heaping helping of criticism to military leadership on both sides and in each country, especially the French, English and Germans.  he does not have much positive to say, though he is certainly in the "but what else could they do" camp.  Politicians, however, come in for quite a bit of abuse from Taylor.  He hammers them left and right, from Wilson's naivete, to hapless Germans like Bethmann and Zimmerman, to Briand and others.  Lloyd George seems to get a bit of praise, though, as Taylor highlight's his demands for convoys and in other recommendations in the face of British military opposition; in fact, he seems a tad enamored with the man.  I am not terribly knowledgeable about Taylor, but given the time the book was written (late 60s, early 70s) I have to wonder if some of the Vietnam era thinking slips into his thought processes.

So, that one was quick.  Back to "origins of the war" reading.  Lucky for me, I found a large cache of them in the Pentagon library!

The Riddle of the Sands by Erskine Childers

The Riddle of the Sands is a bit different from previous books in that it is fiction.  I've always intended to include fiction in this little project, but this one dates back to 1903, well before the war.  So, then, why read it?  Simply because it was a key influence in the pre-war mindset of Britain.

Aside from being one of the earliest spy novels (and considered by many to be one of the best), the novel had an outsized effect on popular thinking in the decade or so leading up to the war.  The novel opens with a low-level British foreign office official, Carruthers, accepting an invitation to spend time with an old friend, Davies, sailing his yacht along the North Sea and Baltic coast of Germany.  After a time, Davies informs his guest that he has slowly come to realize that the Germans are up to something along the Frisian coast, an area along the North Sea facing England composed of a string of islands and vast areas of sand that appear as the tides drop away.  His vague ideas were previously solidified when a supposed German yachtsman essentially tried to get him killed during a storm by leading Davies into a dangerous area.  As time goes on, Carruthers comes to believe him and the two begin an exploration of the area to better understand just what is going on, conducting a running cat and mouse game with the yachtsman (revealed later to be a former Royal Navy officer in disgraced exile, now working for the Germans), a sinister local sailor, and a German gunboat captain.  The German plan, finally revealed, is to use the secret waterways through the sands to hide an armada of small craft destined to invade England when the time came.  As the author concludes, he laments the fact that the Royal Navy is scattered across the world, with no significant military ports facing the North Sea to defend against aggression from the Continent.

The novel's conclusion generated a strong sentiment in Britain that they were not ready for war, feeding into efforts by those like Jackie Fisher to better prepare Britain for the possibility of war.  It also helped lead to the creation of facilities like Scapa Flow to counter just the sort of threat postulated in the novel.  Further, the novel came near the cusp of the British shift towards France and impending naval arms race with Germany, and clearly pointed to the potential threat from Germany.  Childers also noted the potential role of submarines and torpedo craft, though this was undoubtedly less influential than his geopolitical and operational-level concerns.

So, an excellent novel; highly recommended.  Also, Childers'  personal life makes for a fascinating read.  From hard-core Victorian imperialist, to World War One hero, to Irish gun-runner, he had quite an adventurous life, although it ended with an Irish firing squad in 1922.

Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War by Max Hastings

Hastings is an old favorite of mine, though in hindsight I've only read a few of his many works (my favorite is, without doubt, The Battle for the Falklands, one of the first real history books I ever bought). Hastings has generally been more associated with his Second World War writings, and this is his first long work on WW1 that I'm aware of.  Still, he is a superb writer and keeps the attention quite well.

Most books on the opening of the Great War tend to focus on either the political-diplomatic aspects, or the military aspects of that time; Hastings tries to do both, and largely succeeds.  However, he does admit that there will likely never be a "definitive" account of the opening of the war, nor does he try to claim such for himself.  His scope is fairly clear - 1914 from start to finish, with only limited mentions of a few events just before, and a few after, but covering as much of that as is manageable.  Although he proceeds generally chronologically, he divides his chapters up between both the Western Front, which he acknowledges as key to the war's course, and spends several chapters covering Eastern Fronts not often covered in any depth (probably most notable being the Galician and Serbian Fronts).  There is no real discussion of events outside of Europe.

In framing the outbreak of the war, Hastings explicitly rejects the notion that this war was morally different than the Second World War.  Despite the writings of Sassoon and others, he does not see the war as being morally ambiguous or unclear.  He firmly assigns the lion share of the blame for the war to Germany and Austria (with Russia as, perhaps, an honorable mention).  But, he is quite clear in believing that, had Germany conquered in 1914 as they did in 1940, Europe would've been a far darker place than many realize, and he quotes from numerous sources to support that conclusion, primarily German.  As part of this discussion, he delves a great deal into atrocities, real, imagined and feigned.  The worst were, unsurprisingly in Serbia, where Austrian and Slavic hatreds ran deep.  But he is quick to point out a good many German ones, as well, primarily in Belgium but also in France and Russia.  Surprisingly to me, he portrays the Russians as quite chivalrous in their conduct, at least in 1914.  His statistics are interesting -- for example, there were over 6000 documented civilian executions by the Germans in August 1914 alone; the Germans claimed the Russians killed around 100 over both August and September combined.

Hastings saves a lot of his ire for specific individuals.  The Kaiser, for instance, "displayed many of the characteristics of a uniformed version of Kenneth Graham's Mister Toad."  Or, "Conrad (Austro-Hungary's military leader) retained a boundless capacity for promoting disaster."  However, his continuing ire is most reserved for Britain's field commander, Sir John French, a "poltroon" who he manages to berate at every turn, with a great deal of merit, I might add.  Indeed, Hastings covers the British Expeditionary Force's activities in great detail, even while constantly reminding the reader that the French and Russians were fighting much larger battles, with tremendous losses (he points out that the deadliest day in WW1 was not at the Somme, but in 1914).  He does not paint the British Army in a very positive light, at least in its effectiveness, though at the same time he heaps praise on the common soldiers and junior officers.  The accounts of the BEF retreat from Mons, consolidation near Paris, the race to the sea, and the desperate defense of Ypres was quite engrossing.

What Hastings does most brilliantly, however, is to personalize his account using the words of those that lived through the war (and many that did not).  Every page drips with personal anecdotes and stories, taken from journals, letters, and the like.  From senior political and military leaders and their circles, down to common soldiers, peasants, and the like, he has a thousand personal details that really help to bring home the war and its effect on Europeans of all stripes.  I could not possibly begin to do this part of the book justice, as the details are countless. (OK, I will include one:  I did not realize that a single territorial unit of the British Army, the London Scottish Regiment, included the actors Basil Rathbone, Claude Rains, Herbert Marshall, Cedric Hardwicke, and Ronald Colman.)
 
So, next up is a slight departure with The Riddle of the Sands, by Erskine Childers.  The novel has been mentioned in several of the books I've read thus far; the author has been mentioned as well, both for his book and the rather colorful life that he led during this time.

The Lions of July: Prelude to War, 1914 by William Jannen Jr.

Jannen presents another what I would call "personality-focused" look at the immediate run-up to the start of the war.  Unlike Massie, he focuses very closely on the period of late June through the first few days of August, 1914.  Given the tight focus, he's able to examine events during this time in a very detailed manner.

Jannen examines the interplay of diplomacy during the crucial month of July, tracing the interactions of key diplomats (primarily ambassadors and foreign secretaries) as the crisis rapidly builds from an assassination in Sarajevo to world war.  Though focused on the diplomats, he does not neglect the influences of political and military leaders, especially with regards to Germany, where both proved to have an inordinate influence on how the crisis spun out of control.

Jannen is pretty clear in his discussion that he felt that no one really wanted a general war.  Austria wanted to pummel Serbia, which had been goading them (and supporting terrorists) for years.  Russia felt themselves as the guarantors of the southern Slavs.  Germany foolishly encouraged the Austrians before they realized what such recklessness would mean for them.  The French were locked into their entente with Russia, and in any case never had a real choice once Germany opted for war.  Britain found herself obligated to Belgium and, to a lesser extent, to France, and in any case had no great desire to see a continent dominated by the German Empire.  Tragedy certainly; far too tragic to call it a farce.

The author does a good job at demonstrating just how cumbersome and slow the machinery was at the time for dealing with international crises.  Although the telephone and telegraph were in use, they were hardly as efficient as might be thought. Radio, too, proved unreliable, as witnessed by the inability of the French Prime Minster and President to receive information while at sea for a crucial few days of the growing crisis.  Add to all this that every country had an ambassador in every capital, thus creating multiple channels of communication and information, often out of synch, dated, and just plain wrong.  Coupled with the personal agendas of all these men and you end up with one great, confusing mess.

But, Jannen settles on fear as the real underlying problem.  In 1914, Europe was in the throes of change.  The monarchies were slowly giving way to more democratic principles.  Some states were growing in power (Germany, Serbia) while others were in decline (Austria-Hungary). Technology, economics, culture and many other aspects of European life were in flux, which fed a feeling of uncertainty and fear.  With the underpinning of fear, a haze of confusion, and overlapping impacts of personality, what follows seems less incomprehensible.  There was no rush to war – most every leader knew this was going to be an utter disaster, but no one knew how to stop it, though many tried desperately to do so.

Much of the current writing on the impending 100^th anniversary as focused on blame.  Jannen does not directly address this, though I would think his opinion on the matter is fairly clear – Germany and Austria-Hungary deserve the lion share of it, given Austria’s almost monomaniacal fixation on Serbia and Germany’s “blank cheque” policy of urging Austria on, plus it’s utter reliance on the Schlieffen Plan which guaranteed that any war involving Germany was going to involve France, Russia, Austria, Germany, and probably Britain and even Italy, among others.  I think Serbia looks culpable to a degree, as well.  By bearding the Austrians repeatedly, supporting terrorists and secessionists, and the like, they were certainly guilty of goading the Austrians.  Last, I’d add Russia for being the first to go to general mobilization, which certainly weighted heavily on the Germans.  But, at the end of the day, with such a complex confluence of events it is hard to point to a single cause or party to blame, and that is perhaps why Jannen avoids anything overly explicit along these lines.

Jannen provides good insight into the gory details of the last days of diplomacy before the war erupted.  Thankfully, he also provides a list of all the players – it was quite confusing at times.  Adding to the confusion, and probably a good indicator of what Europe was like in 1914, is that many of the players’ names did not match what might be expected of their nationality.  So, the German ambassador to Russia had a French-sounding name, the British ambassador to Vienna had a French name,  the French undersecretary for foreign affairs had an English name, several key Russians had Germanic names, some Austrians had Italian names, the Austrian ambassador to London had a compound French-German name, and so on.  The author does not mention this, but it is indicative of a much more integrated, confused Europe, where borders certainly did not match the locations of national groups.  I’m sure a lot more could be said of this, and what it meant for subsequent history.

So, book number three is down.  Up next is Max Hastings (a favorite author of mine) and Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War.

Lessons of World War One

Victor Davis Hanson has a good article on lessons from WW1...

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/371300/lessons-world-war-i-victor-davis-hanson

"Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War" by Robert K Massie

Well, this is long in coming!  But, in my defense, this book is quite the door-stopper!  At 1000+ pages, it took a little longer to tackled than I'd anticipated.

Where to begin?  Massie's book covers the politics and personalities of the late 19th Century, focusing on Germany and Britain, without neglecting other key players - French, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and the like.    I think the over-used phrase tour de force applies in this case.  I'm amazed at how dense, yet readable this book is.

I'm not an historian, so I don't necessarily think in those sorts of terms.  However, Massie is clearly focused on the personalities as the drivers of his late 19th, early 20th Century European history.  Every page delves into the intricacies of the many players of his history - personal quirks, leisure activities, mistresses, friendships and hatred -- he covers them all.  I would say that, at its core, this is a book about how conflicting personalities drove this critical period of history.  It's not so much about greater, external trends so much is it is about how the interplay of many (interesting and colorful) people led to the Great War.  Massie does a superb job of making one get to know his vast cast of characters (bigger and far more complex than any soap opera or 1970s mini series!).  Despite his personality focus, he does manage to have some good sections on technology, everything from shipbuilding, to gunnery, torpedoes, submarines, and the like.  He does this while still providing enough context to make a complete picture, or as near as one can with a mere thousand pages.

Since this is a predominately character-driven history, talking about them all is impossible.  So, I will just cherry-pick a few ideas.  There are some definite heroes in this book.  Jacky Fisher, "father" of the modern Royal Navy is certainly one, and he is given a great deal of page count discussing his extensive reforms, and how they took a hidebound navy still focused on Trafalgar and turned it into something ready for the modern age.  Other personages given a favorable appraisal range from Queen Victoria (far from the clichéd image of a passive old woman) to Winston Churchill (a relative latecomer to the story).  Giants like Bismarck have a more nuanced portrayal - competent, yes, but not necessarily a benign influence on these events.

The closest thing to the villains of the piece?  I'd say Admiral Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm himself.  The former is portrayed (rightly, I think) as single-minded in his quest for a great Navy.  The Kaiser, on the other hand, is depicted as conflicted (his love-hate relationship with his English family in particular), unsteady, and unpredictable.  He's clearly seen as possessing a dangerous mixture of an inferiority complex coupled with a heightened sense of his own grandeur.  A dangerous mix, to be sure (Side note:  I guess I never realized that, after his abdication, he went to live in the Netherlands and managed to live long enough to end up living under Nazi occupation, which he apparently approved of).

Tirpitz is an interesting study.  His "risk theory" is a key component of the naval arms race.  The theory held that Germany need not build a navy to match Britain one for one.  Rather, Germany need only build enough ships such that, in the case of a fight, Britain would lose so many ships that it lost its premier place in naval power.  With that the case, Britain would be disinclined to fight a naval war with Germany.  But, couple that with Britain's stated desire to remain as strong as the next two naval powers, and the naval arms race becomes all but inevitable.  Massie, focusing on individuals, also factors in the Kaiser.  Wilhelm II was strongly influenced by his grandmother, Queen Victoria, and her country's navy.  Like any insecure youngster, he tends to imitate those he most admires, and in his case, that meant ships.  Whether it was racing yachts to show up his British cousins, or battleships, his personality was a key factor.

It's hard to do a book like this justice, given its complexity.  However, I will say that it has filled in a gap in my own knowledge about European politics of the latter half of the 19th Century through 1914.

"A Short History of the Great War" by James L. Stokesbury

One down, 99 (or so) to go!

As an introductory overview to the Great War, Stokesbury proved to be an excellent choice (full disclosure: I read this one 10 or 15 years ago, though my poor abused memory didn't really remember much about it).  Stokesbury does an excellent job of presenting an overview of the entire war, managing to hit most all of the big highlights, theaters, campaigns, personalities, technologies and the like.  He does this with a dry sense of humor, and notably without the bitterness and condescension that can be found in other Great War histories.  There is a hint of cynicism here and there, but it was coupled with a definite feeling that he could understand how the war could grind on like it did, and his cynicism seems more the result of the feelings of inevitability, frustration, and hopelessness at how the war unfolded.  Given the constant striving to break out somewhere, anywhere; the pyrrhic victories; the supremacy of the defense and the lack of technology that would favor movement, this seems justified.

Stokesbury follows a fairly straight-forward, linear approach to his history.  He does an admirable job of looking at every region touched by the war; from Africa, to the Middle East, and even manages to mention the relatively minor events in the Pacific.  Still, his focus always returns to the Western Front, as it inevitably must.  Although a "short history," he pulls this off well.  One can quibble with what he leaves out, but that's the price of keeping it short but comprehensive.  I will, however, quibble, because I can!  The one thing he explicitly pays little heed to during the course of the war is politics, aside from in Russia where it was so utterly critical.  He calls the war the "soldier's act" (followed by the "politician's act" when it ends).  Being a Clausewitz fan, this might be a little too neat of a division, but hardly a fatal flaw in this particular book.

Speaking of coverage, one area I thought he seemed to hit inordinately often was the Italian campaign.  I did not go back and do a page count or anything, but it seemed to come up more often than might be expected -- perhaps I'm just thinking that because of the news story recently about discovering frozen soldiers and positions from the war still intact from those battles.  Given that this theater does not get much attention in most histories, I suppose I can't fault him.

Melting glaciers in northern Italy reveal corpses of WW1 soldiers

The Short History of World War I came out in 1981; the publisher's blurb says it was the first general history of the war in 20 years.  I don't know how accurate that statement is, but given how this war was overshadowed for so long by World War 2, it seems plausible.  In fact, one of the things that Stokesbury says is that many older histories of the Great War were inaccurate or skewed, and it was high time for a revisiting.  At the same time he seems to hit on many of the common explanations for why the war started, and how it was fought.  For example, he uses terms like "blind leadership," mentions that "wisdom was not a dominant quality" among leaders, and so on.  Ultimately, his root causes boil down to a "dangerous political imbalance," with population growth as the most profound driver of it.  He adds that nationalism and Darwinism led to militarism.

My only other criticism of the book is that it did not have enough maps!  There were a few serviceable ones, but they were all wide area, and not terribly helpful in following the action, especially on the Western Front during some of the key campaigns and battles.  I'm a map fiend, so I could not let this pass unsaid! 

So, bottom line, Stokesbury is an excellent guide and intro to the war from the 10,000 foot level.  Next up will be Dreadnought by Robert K. Massie.  Perhaps "Massive" would be more accurate, as this one is 1000 pages, give or take.  I'm not quite a hundred in, so it might be a bit before I can post on it!

First Book

Happy New Year! 

I'm starting my first reading selection this week with A Short History of World War One by James Stokesbury.  Based on some sage advice, I'm using this book as an overview of the entire war, sort of a quick tourist-eyed view before starting to delve into more specific topics.  I'll probably read a few more general histories, as well, as time goes on to keep from being buried under details!

More to follow on Stokesbury when I can get through it.  My plan remains to read approximately two books per month between now and December 2018.

A copy of the current book list is at:  https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0CQHdL1aq0qeml0S3BjSVRKeGs/edit?usp=sharing

Any suggestions on this project are appreciated!