The Great War at Sea - Photos

A very good collection:

http://www.nationalreview.com/slideshows/385118

The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World by Holger Herwig

Herwig's The Marne, 1914 is an account of the earliest battles on the Western Front. It overlaps quite a bit with other accounts (The Guns of August and Catastrophe 1914, for example), but provides a slightly different perspective, as Herwig tries to incorporate more of a German perspective on this period (the book is dedicated to his grandfather who fought and died in the Imperial German Army). Herwig is a superb writer and this was one of the better books I've read thus far for this project. He repeatedly emphasizes the invaluable collection of documents freed up by the end of the Cold War, records thought destroyed by the Allies in 1945 but actually secretly captured by the Soviets. He covers his timeframe chronologically.

Herwig argues that the Marne was the most important battle since Waterloo, and he makes a solid case to support this broad assertion. Briefly, he argues that, though the Marne did not result in either a French or German victory, the fact that it was a stalemate ensured that the war would be a long one, the result being the fall of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires, the rise of fascism and communism, etc.

Herwig does a good job of portraying the German side, especially the disconnects and poor coordination between Kluck's First Army and Bulows' Second Army and the critical move through Belgium and into France. He also hammers home Moltke's poor command and control efforts and lack of coordination between the various moving parts of the Schlieffen plan. He seems to imply that, with better coordination, the German attack might just have succeeded, though he stops short of being explicit on this point. Given the logistical difficulties for Germany, and French interior lines (formation of the 6th Army north of Paris, as an example of how this really helped France), that would be a hard case to argue.

Personally, what I liked most about this book was that it covered the early battles of the war in much greater detail than I've read to date, especially the battle of the Frontiers to the south, an area usually glossed over in other accounts. While not decisive, maybe, these battles consumed huge numbers of soldiers and equipment and were a major contributor to the tremendous attrition of the first weeks of the war.

Some quibbles with the book, though. First, he uses Army historical maps that are somewhat unclear and not always the best depictions of what he is describing. No doubt this saved a good deal of money, but better maps would've helped. Second, he has a tendency to list lots of units and names in rapid succession, making for dense and confusing reading at times. While possibly useful for some, too much detail is just as bad as too little.

All in all, an excellent book and much recommended.

Origins of the First World War by William Mulligan

Time for some catch-up, so this will be short!

Mulligan's Origins of the First World War is a view of the war's origins through the lens of an international relations theorist. That, of course, means it’s a bit drier than most accounts. Still, it makes for an interesting perspective somewhat different in approach from most of the historical accounts I've been reading this year. His primary approach to his analysis is through the lens of globalism and the long term waning of great power conflict. More crucially, he is less interested in the traditional explanations of the war's causes, and is much more concerned with why the war occurred as a result of the July Crisis, and did not occur sooner. In other words, what was different about 1914 than every other crisis in the first decade and a half of the Twentieth Century. He concludes that the July Crisis was not simply a trigger, but a cause in its own right.

For his analysis, Mulligan looks back through post-Napoleonic European history, examining why there was such a long period of peace between Great Powers. This examination is a key part of his book, as he posits that Great Power conflict waned dramatically after Waterloo (he does not mention him, but he definitely seems to be in the Stephen Pinker school of thought). He looks at two balances of power - one within Europe proper, and one with a world-wide perspective; he discusses at length how the two affected one another. He argues that, prior to the Second Morocco Crisis, conflicts did not involve vital interest; those after, did. Further, the alliance system that evolved made wars less likely, not more so, a difference between him and other authors.

As a side, he has a long discussion of the effects of public opinion. He sees it as complex and changing over the time examined, but does not see it as a factor in the war starting. As part of this, he discusses "defensive patriotism" at length, by which he means public opinion in most countries generally did not wish war, but were willing to fight under some circumstances. Public opinion was really more of a tool of politics than an influencer, but it did set some broad limits on what was possible.

A bit dry, but interesting to see a different approach.

A Little Side-reading - Strachan on Strategy

I was stuck in the Pentagon for an hour with nothing to do, so I wandered into the library to read the paper and ran across this article by Hew Strachan in The American Interest on the impact of WW1 on strategy.  It's a bit complex, probably, but interesting, especially given the amount of time I've been thinking "strategic thoughts" for work, of late.

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/06/02/the-strategic-consequences-of-the-world-war/

The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War by David G. Hermann

I finally got my reading going again after a visit to the Pentagon Library to plunder some new material. Herrmann's book proved to be an excellent one to start with and I was sure to do a good deal of reading on 28 June, the 100th anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

Herrmann's work is a comparative examination of the armies of the Great Powers in the decade prior to World War I, told chronologically around the series of escalating crises during that time and how those events shaped the armies that would go on to fight the war. He acknowledges that the naval arms race has been written about extensively, but feels that less has been said about the later land forces arms race just prior to the war. He summarizes this decade prior to war as the story of Russia's prostration, recovery, and the effects of this on the perception of relative power. Indeed, the perception of power is key to his analysis. He does not view this perception of power so much as a cause of the war, however, but argues that it is crucial for understanding the timing of the war. All of this is told through the historical lens of the two Moroccan crises, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Annexation crisis, and the Balkan Wars.

Given that we're in the 100th anniversary month for the run up to the war, I'm really focusing on causes with my write-up. Herrmann more or less accepts many of the causes for war already out there - social Darwinism, imperialism, militarism, interlocking alliances, the focus on the offense over defense, and so on. His focus remains firmly on the timing. He argues that all of these factors existed throughout the decade of 1904-1914, and that there were many crises during this time that could've led to a world war, many of them far more serious than an assassination. Some crises, like the naval arms race between Germany and Britain were actually winding down. So why did those other crises not lead to war but 1914's events did? In a nutshell, he points to the perception of relative strength between the two coalitions, largely centered on the restoration of Russian power.

Russia's disastrous defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War left the Czar in a precarious position. His military had been smashed on land and sea to a "mere" Asiatic power. The defeat had led to revolution in his capital. Russia was a beaten, tired power; it would take years to recover from the disaster, but recover they did. As this decade started and progressed, Germany and Austria-Hungary felt that they had a preponderance of power in Europe, and were willing to use this power to threaten their rivals, replacing more traditional diplomacy with a more blustery foreign policy. Despite the mounting crises, they managed to avoid a general war as the perception of their strength prevented it.  However, after the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911-12 (AKA Agadir), Germany suddenly realized that the Russian military restoration, coupled with a strengthening Entente between Britain and France, seemed to indicate a change in the correlation of forces (to use a Soviet term). The perception had shifted on both sides. For the Central Powers, their window of military dominance was ending and would eventually close - despite Germany’s continued increase in power, the outlook for its Austro-Hungarian ally was far less sanguine. Russia had been humiliated during the period of its weakness. As the self-proclaimed guardian of the southern Slavs, Russia had been unable to intervene during the various Balkan crises on behalf of the Serbs. In 1914, it felt it was capable of doing so. Again, the perception of relative power drove the timing of the war. Also, Herrmann points out that in 1914, all the powers viewed a diplomatic defeat as worse than war, given the rough balance of power at that time.

The second Moroccan crisis was the real trigger point. Prior to this point, military expansion and improvement were conducted at a steady pace by all of the Great Powers; after it, Germany triggered an arms race between all the continental powers; each Power now began to expand its army dramatically through a variety of means. War was increasingly being seen as either inevitable, in which case military expansion was important, or as inevitable in the absence of any sort of balance of military power. Either way, an arms race was the result. Of interest, all the major armaments programs in the continental powers were targeted to be completed in 1916 or even later; they were all still in progress in 1914.

Without delving through the author's data, it was fascinating to read his analysis of the various armies during this decade. He uses a great deal of primary sources to paint his picture, the best being the reports of various foreign observers at the different annual army exercises each country held. Herrmann also digs into the technology, looking at the integration of machine guns, aircraft, and especially modern artillery into each major army. This part of the book, interspersed through the discussion of the series of crises, was most interesting.

So, overall an excellent book, one that complements nicely the many other studies of causes for the war. This is another one I'm glad to have read!

On the weird trivia and fun facts, Herrmann mentions in passing experiments with painting horses for camouflage (I'd love to see that dazzle pattern!), the fact that the only significant military secret kept before the war was Germany’s development of the huge 420mm mortar that could fire a plunging shot 13 kilometers, and that early on machine guns were viewed primarily as a replacement for artillery for units that could not bring organic artillery with them for some reason (i.e. mountain troops, cavalry, etc.).

Arlington at 150: WW1 Tour

Not a reading thing, but I took a WW1-centric tour of Arlington as part of the cemetery's 150th anniversary.  Here are a few pics:

Meuse-Argonne Cross

General Tasker Bliss, Chief of Staff of the Army during the war

GEN Pershing, Commander AEF

CPL Frank Buckles, last surviving WW1 Vet (looking towards GEN Pershing)

SGT Edward Younger - he selected the unknown soldier for WW1

LTG James Harbord, USA, Commanded the Marines at Belleau Wood



LTC Charles Pierce - in charge of repatriating remains of U.S. forces back to the U.S.

The Origins of the First World War by Ruth Henig

This was a short book, so this will be a short entry (it is one I found in the bowels of the Pentagon Library). Henig's is a brief summary of scholarly positions on the origins of the war framing a brief survey of events from the rise of Bismarck through 1914. It is intended as a preparation for "advanced exams" though I'm not sure exactly what that means (sounds Harry Potterish to me).

Her focus initially is on the longer term factors already discussed: industrialization, urbanization, German economic growth, social Darwinism, and the like. In Germany, she focuses heavily on the clash between liberalism/socialism/democracy and the Junker aristocracy. Indeed, she spends most of her time looking at Germany, concluding that Bismarck's diplomatic efforts achieved shorter-term stability but at the cost of longer term problems.

She does a decent job of covering the essential events of 1912-1914 in a short amount of space, concluding that the war was not that which the powers had prepared themselves for, mentally or materially. As for war guilt, she does a good job of providing a scholarly survey (a sort of literature review) of the main schools of thought, from 1919 to the present. She definitely agrees with Fritz Fischer, the "father" of German war guilt as the explanation for the war, providing a summary of how he went from academic pariah to widely accepted.

It's a quick little book, and not much new ground, but I rather liked the academic approach to covering the main scholars on the topic.

Next up will probably be a brief WW1 hiatus as I prep for some new grad school classes I am teaching this summer.