The Great War at Sea - Photos

A very good collection:

http://www.nationalreview.com/slideshows/385118

The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World by Holger Herwig

Herwig's The Marne, 1914 is an account of the earliest battles on the Western Front. It overlaps quite a bit with other accounts (The Guns of August and Catastrophe 1914, for example), but provides a slightly different perspective, as Herwig tries to incorporate more of a German perspective on this period (the book is dedicated to his grandfather who fought and died in the Imperial German Army). Herwig is a superb writer and this was one of the better books I've read thus far for this project. He repeatedly emphasizes the invaluable collection of documents freed up by the end of the Cold War, records thought destroyed by the Allies in 1945 but actually secretly captured by the Soviets. He covers his timeframe chronologically.

Herwig argues that the Marne was the most important battle since Waterloo, and he makes a solid case to support this broad assertion. Briefly, he argues that, though the Marne did not result in either a French or German victory, the fact that it was a stalemate ensured that the war would be a long one, the result being the fall of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires, the rise of fascism and communism, etc.

Herwig does a good job of portraying the German side, especially the disconnects and poor coordination between Kluck's First Army and Bulows' Second Army and the critical move through Belgium and into France. He also hammers home Moltke's poor command and control efforts and lack of coordination between the various moving parts of the Schlieffen plan. He seems to imply that, with better coordination, the German attack might just have succeeded, though he stops short of being explicit on this point. Given the logistical difficulties for Germany, and French interior lines (formation of the 6th Army north of Paris, as an example of how this really helped France), that would be a hard case to argue.

Personally, what I liked most about this book was that it covered the early battles of the war in much greater detail than I've read to date, especially the battle of the Frontiers to the south, an area usually glossed over in other accounts. While not decisive, maybe, these battles consumed huge numbers of soldiers and equipment and were a major contributor to the tremendous attrition of the first weeks of the war.

Some quibbles with the book, though. First, he uses Army historical maps that are somewhat unclear and not always the best depictions of what he is describing. No doubt this saved a good deal of money, but better maps would've helped. Second, he has a tendency to list lots of units and names in rapid succession, making for dense and confusing reading at times. While possibly useful for some, too much detail is just as bad as too little.

All in all, an excellent book and much recommended.

Origins of the First World War by William Mulligan

Time for some catch-up, so this will be short!

Mulligan's Origins of the First World War is a view of the war's origins through the lens of an international relations theorist. That, of course, means it’s a bit drier than most accounts. Still, it makes for an interesting perspective somewhat different in approach from most of the historical accounts I've been reading this year. His primary approach to his analysis is through the lens of globalism and the long term waning of great power conflict. More crucially, he is less interested in the traditional explanations of the war's causes, and is much more concerned with why the war occurred as a result of the July Crisis, and did not occur sooner. In other words, what was different about 1914 than every other crisis in the first decade and a half of the Twentieth Century. He concludes that the July Crisis was not simply a trigger, but a cause in its own right.

For his analysis, Mulligan looks back through post-Napoleonic European history, examining why there was such a long period of peace between Great Powers. This examination is a key part of his book, as he posits that Great Power conflict waned dramatically after Waterloo (he does not mention him, but he definitely seems to be in the Stephen Pinker school of thought). He looks at two balances of power - one within Europe proper, and one with a world-wide perspective; he discusses at length how the two affected one another. He argues that, prior to the Second Morocco Crisis, conflicts did not involve vital interest; those after, did. Further, the alliance system that evolved made wars less likely, not more so, a difference between him and other authors.

As a side, he has a long discussion of the effects of public opinion. He sees it as complex and changing over the time examined, but does not see it as a factor in the war starting. As part of this, he discusses "defensive patriotism" at length, by which he means public opinion in most countries generally did not wish war, but were willing to fight under some circumstances. Public opinion was really more of a tool of politics than an influencer, but it did set some broad limits on what was possible.

A bit dry, but interesting to see a different approach.